A large inflow of immigrants to Western Europe and the USA in the last decade raises a question about the association between the size of the immigrant population and anti-immigrant attitudes. The group threat theory predicts that the increase in the number of immigrants may lead to more xenophobia. Empirical studies conducted in Europe so far produced contradictory results. Most studies found that there is a positive correlation between immigrant population size and anti-immigrant attitudes, but some studies did not detect any effects. There is an increasing understanding in the literature that attitudes to immigrants from different regions vary and some immigrant groups may trigger negative reactions of the natives to a larger extent than others.
In this paper we explore these ideas looking at the attitudes towards immigrants in Russia. Despite having one of the largest immigrant populations in the world, Russia has rarely been in the focus when it comes to studies of attitudes to immigrants. We use a survey of 24,500 individuals conducted in 2011 to investigate whether anti-immigrant attitudes in Russia can be better explained by economic competition at the individual level or the group threat theory. The sample size and design of the survey allow us to compare attitudes towards immigrants across Russian regions and identify regional level correlates of xenophobic attitudes. This analysis contributes to testing the group threat theory and to the discussion of macro-level contextual determinants of anti-immigrant prejudice. In addition, the paper presents an analysis of the attitudes towards different immigrant ethnic groups and explores an ethnic hierarchy in the attitudes towards immigrants.
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The group threat theory receives some support from the data. Attitudes towards immigrants in regions with a higher immigrant concentration are more negative. At the same time, poorer regions are also more xenophobic. Not all immigrants are equally unwelcome. Ukrainians and Moldovans are more acceptable to Russians than immigrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Interestingly, this perceived ethnic hierarchy is shared by all large ethnic groups populating Russia.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a review of the main theories that explain anti-immigrant attitudes and formulates research questions. Section 2 presents main facts about international migration in Russia and reviews previous studies of anti-immigrant attitudes in this country. Section 4 discusses the data and modelling strategy, section 5 presents results of the analysis and section 6 discusses the findings.
1 Determinants of the attitudes to immigrants.
Research questions
One of the central theoretical questions in the study of anti-immigrant attitudes is whether they can be better explained by individuals' economic circumstances or concerns about cultural and economic effects of immigration at the group level. Two main theories have been proposed.
According to the labour market competition theory, immigrants may constitute an economic threat to native workers, especially in low paid unskilled occupations. Since the reservation wage of many immigrants is lower than for natives they may push local workers out of the labour 4 market and increase unemployment. This also intensifies competition over housing. In response, natives may form negative attitudes about immigrants and immigration (see, for example, Mayda, 2006) . According to this theory, individuals form their attitudes on the basis of their personal economic interests.
The group threat theory suggests that negative views about immigrants are mostly driven by concerns about the effect of immigration on society at large (see a review in Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010) . These concerns may be cultural (such as the fear of losing natives' collective identity) or economic (such as worries about the fiscal contribution of immigrants). Thus, people may perceive immigrants as a threat irrespective of their personal economic status.
Most research conducted to date suggests that the perceived cultural and economic threat at the societal level is more important for determining attitudes towards immigrants than personal economic circumstances (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) . Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) showed that individual cultural values and beliefs explained attitudes towards immigrants better than economic concerns. Dustmann and Preston (2007) demonstrated that for the British public, welfare and cultural concerns about immigration outweighed concerns related to the labour market competition.
One of the ways to test the economic competition theory empirically is simply to look at the individual level correlates of attitudes towards immigrants. If people's attitudes are driven by their personal economic circumstances we may expect the unemployed and members of occu-pations where competition with the immigrants is stronger to be more xenophobic. To test the group threat theory researchers usually looked at the macro-level correlates of anti-immigrant views, often with data from the European Social Survey (ESS), the Eurobarometer, and other cross-national surveys. We may expect that a higher concentration of immigrants will activate the group threat mechanism and will be associated with more negative attitudes. Economic conditions may also be important if group threat is mostly perceived as related to the economy: in countries with lower incomes and higher unemployment the impact of immigration may be viewed as mostly negative.
A number of studies, starting with the pioneering work by Quillian (1995) , empirically assessed the association between the proportion of immigrants in the population and anti-immigrant views. In European countries with more immigrants attitudes towards them were generally more negative (Meuleman et al., 2009; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006 Semyonov et al., , 2008 Schneider, 2008) . However, most studies were crosssectional and it is unclear if the observed statistical association can be interpreted as causal. (See Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) on the recent research aimed to strengthen causal inference in studies of the attitudes towards immigrants). More recently, several studies looked at the macrolevel predictors of xenophobic views at a regional rather than national level. Hjerm (2009) studied attitudes towards immigrants at the municipal level in Sweden and concluded that the proportion of immigrants was not associated with the attitudes towards them. Evidence from the UK suggested that attitudes towards immigrants in London where many 6 foreigners resided were better than in other parts of the country, even among white Britons (Blinder, 2011) . Rustenbach (2010) used the ESS data and did not find an effect of the number of immigrants on attitudes either at the regional or national levels. Contrary to this, in the regionallevel analysis based on the ESS data Markaki and Longhi (2013) found a positive association between the proportion of immigrants born outside the EU and the anti-immigrant views.
The literature in this field has often treated immigrants as a homogeneous group. However, the countries of origin of immigrants are different from one European country to another and public attitudes are likely to vary depending on immigrants' ethnicity. Ford (2011) provided evidence that in Britain immigration from Australia and Western Europe faced weaker public opposition than immigration from Africa, South Asia and the Caribbean. In Switzerland immigrants from former Yugoslavia and Turkey were perceived more negatively than immigrants from northern and western European countries (Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013) . Bridges and Mateut (2014) showed that Europeans were more likely to oppose immigration of racially different groups. Incorporating ethnic heterogeneity of immigrant populations is important for a more nuanced understanding of public attitudes towards them.
Some ideas from social psychology may be helpful in this regard. Hagendoorn (1995) showed that Russian students were more prejudiced when they had a majority rather than a minority status, but there was no difference across locations for Ukrainians and Tatars. With the data from the same survey, Hagendoorn et al. (1998) Figure 1 ). Although, strictly speaking, the sample was not designed to be representative at the national level and the selection of regions was largely dictated by convenience and was not random, the regions in the sample represent about 77% of Russia's population.
Multistage stratified sampling was used to sample 500 individuals aged over 17 in each region so that the design of the survey is suitable for cross-regional comparisons. To get descriptive statistics at the national level (or rather at the level representing 77% of Russia's population) we apply weight coefficients inversely proportional to the regional population size. All the interviews were conducted using the face-to-face method at the respondents' homes. Table A1 Next, we add to the model regional level predictors. We use two independent measures of immigrant population density: the regional proportion of legally employed immigrants and the number of international money transfers in the region. These variables test the group threat theory. According to the official data, in 2011 1.76 million foreign nationals had either a work permit or a patent that allowed them to be legally employed. It is more difficult to estimate the number of those employed illegally, but it was likely to be at least just as many. Work permit and patent quotas were assigned at the regional level, and we use the number of legally employed foreign nationals in the region (divided by the size of the regional population aged over 16) as a proxy for immigrant 16 concentration.
To check robustness of our findings, we employ another measure of immigrant concentration. The Bank of Russia keeps statistics on the number of international money transfers made by individuals without opening a bank account. While these data include all the payments made by Russian citizens and immigrants, in practice this type of payment is typical for the money transfer systems that immigrants often use for sending remittances. We only use the data for the payments made to individuals (not organisations) outside of Russia. The earliest year for which these data are available is 2013. As we are mostly interested in the regional differences, we assume that the geographical distribution of immigrants did not change significantly in 2013 compared to 2011. For the analysis we use the data on the number of money transfers divided by the size of the regional population aged over 16.
To test a hypothesis that regional economic conditions may be associated with attitudes to immigrants we employ two measures: the regional unemployment rate and monthly income-to-subsistence ratio (to account for regional differences in the consumer price index) in 2011. The data for both variables come from the official surveys conducted by the Russian Statistical Office. We hypothesize that education may have a liberalizing effect on attitudes towards immigrants not only at the individual, but also at the group level and to test this we introduce a variable measuring the proportion of people with a higher education in the regions. Finally, ethnic composition of the region may have an effect on attitudes towards immigrants even after controlling for ethnicity of individual respondents.
More specifically, more ethnically diverse regions may be less xenophobic.
To test this, we use the proportion of ethnic Russians in the regions as a measure of ethnic diversity. The data for the proportion of people with a higher education and proportion of ethnic Russians come from the 2010 census.
Finally, to explore the ethnic hierarchy in attitudes to immigrants we conduct an analysis of mean attitudes towards different immigrant ethnic groups by ethnicity.
Results
Russians are sceptical about immigration and immigrants. 53% of the respondents said that they would support banning permanent immigration from outside of Russia. Answering the question about their attitudes towards potential immigrant neighbours, only 15% of the respondents said they would be 'rather' or 'completely negative' about Ukrainians (the survey was conducted three years before the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014-15). For immigrants from Moldova this figure goes up to 25% while for the Caucasus it was 53%, for South-East Asia 54%, for Central Asia 56%, and for the North Caucasus 61%. A clear ethnic hierarchy emerges from these numbers as Russians seem to be more welcoming to Ukrainians and Moldovans and more hostile towards the other four groups. Note that, despite the North Caucasus being part of Russia the attitudes towards people from this region are most negative.
The first step in the analysis is to look at the individual level correlates of anti-immigrant attitudes, with a particular focus on the socio-economic characteristics of individuals. Table 1 .7) ). Decomposition of R 2 using hierarchical partitioning (Grömping, 2006) suggests that ethnicity is by far the most important predictor, followed by immigration experience, location, religion and education (in this order).
( Table 2 about The association between regional unemployment and anti-immigrant attitudes is negative (when unemployment is high ethnic prejudice is weaker), although it is not statistically significant at the 95% level. There is virtually no association between regional income and ethnic prejudice. (Table 3 about here) 2 After adding the individual level predictors to the empty model with regional intercepts the regional level outcome variance diminishes by 5%. This suggests that only about 5% of the regional outcome variance can be explained by the differences in the socio-demographic composition of the population across the regions. The next analytic step is to consider ethnic heterogeneity in the attitudes towards immigrants from different regions. Table 2 The unemployed and manual workers hold only marginally more negative views on immigrants than non-manual employees. Personal income is not associated with ethnic prejudice. Thus, answering the first research question, we may conclude that the theory that explains negative attitudes towards immigrants by the natives' fear of economic competition does not find much support in our data. It is hard to make definite conclusions with cross-sectional data though, and longitudinal data would be better suited to explore whether personal economic trajectories have any effect on ethnic prejudice.
The group threat theory seems to be more relevant to explaining anti-immigrant prejudice in Russia. If the theory is correct, a higher concentration of immigrants should lead to more negative attitudes toward them (although in many cases natives overestimate the size of immigrant populations and this can still trigger the group threat mechanism). We do indeed observe a positive correlation between immigrant concentration at the regional level (measured in two alternative ways) and anti-immigrant attitudes. As usual in cross-sectional analysis, causality is hard to prove here. We can exclude reverse causation as it is unlikely that immigrants (Quillian, 1995) and regional (Markaki and Longhi, 2013) levels.
In respect to our third research question, we find that attitudes to- The random intercept model. The dependent variable varies from one (least xenophobic) to five (most xenophobic). The model was fitted using residual maximum likelihood (REML). However, the deviance reported is from the model fitted with maximum likelihood (ML), so that it can be used to construct likelihood ratio tests. R 2 calculated according to the method in Snijders and Bosker (2012, ch.7). (24500) 2.5 2.8 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8 Only ethnic groups with n > 30 included. The scale ranges from 1 to 5 where 1 is the most positive and 5 is the most negative attitude. Ethnic groups in rows and regions of origin in columns ordered according to the mean attitude. All the values were averaged across five imputed data sets. Weight coefficients applied. The random-intercept models account for all individual-level predictors from Table 1 , but the coefficients are not shown. Standard errors in the parentheses. The dependent variable varies from one (least xenophobic) to five (most xenophobic). The models were fitted using residual maximum likelihood (REML). However, the deviance reported is from the model fitted with maximum likelihood (ML), so that it can be used to construct likelihood ratio tests. First imputation was used to report L 2 . The random intercept model. The dependent variables vary from one (least xenophobic) to five (most xenophobic). The random-intercept models account for all individual-level predictors from Table 1 , but the coefficients are not shown. The dependent variable varies from one (least xenophobic) to five (most xenophobic). The random-intercept models account for all individual-level predictors from Table 1 , but the coefficients are not shown. Standard errors in the parentheses. The dependent variable varies from one (least xenophobic) to five (most xenophobic).
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